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Abstract
This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can con-
sult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the
previous work by Holmstr om (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who con-
sider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal decision rules, we
prove a \constant-threat" result that states that any out-of-equilibrium pair of rec-
ommendations by the experts are punished with an action that is independent of
their reports. A particular property of an optimal decision rule is that it is simple
and constant for a large set of experts' preferences and distribution of their private
information. Hence, it is robust in the sense that it is not aected by errors in spec-
ifying these features of the environment. By contrast, the constructions of optimal
outcomes absent commitment or with only one expert are sensitive to model details.
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The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 of the United States of America grants certain
types of auto dealerships that were terminated by the manufacturer on or before April
29, 2009 the right to seek through binding arbitration reinstatement of the dealership
agreement.1 The law mandates that the arbitrator shall balance the economic interest of
the dealership, the economic interest of the manufacturer, and the economic interest of
the public at large and shall decide whether or not the dealership should be added to the
dealer network of the manufacturer.
This is an example of an environment with two parties (a manufacturer and a deal-
ership) who have decision relevant information and whose preferences are not perfectly
aligned with each other's and with those of the principal (the government and, more gen-
erally, the public). The arbitration is a binding mechanism to which the parties resort if
they fail to reach an agreement by themselves.
Two features of the arbitration procedure are noteworthy. First, the arbitrator is re-
stricted in the scope of the award { she can either reinstate the original dealership agree-
ment or not, but the law does not allow the arbitrator to modify the agreement. Second,
the arbitration decision is inherently uncertain from the perspective of the dealership and
the manufacturer due to their imperfect knowledge about the arbitrator's views on how
to balance economic interests at stake. These features are not atypical in arbitration and
have been discussed in the law literature.2
In this paper, we study optimal decision rules in environments with two informed
experts (agents) and an uninformed decision maker (principal). Our results suggest that
randomness of arbitration award and its limited scope can be desirable. Furthermore,
it can be optimal for the arbitrator's decision, while random, to be independent of the
arguments supplied by the parties.
Our model features two strategic experts who are biased in dierent directions (other
things being equal, the dealership is more eager than the manufacturer to get the dealer-
ship agreement renewed).3 The set of feasible actions is a unit interval. A socially optimal
1See H.R.3288 - 187, Section 747 of the Act.
2The questions of interest in that literature are whether limitations on the remedies that can be
awarded by the arbitrator should be enforceable (see, e.g., D. S. Schwartz, \Understanding Remedy-
Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles," 38 U.S.F. L. Rev.
49 (2003-2004), pp. 49-104) and whether randomness in arbitration decisions justies allowing for ex-
post judicial review (see, e.g., S. P. Younger, \Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards," 63 Alb. L. Rev. 241 (1999-2000), pp. 241-262 and L. Goldman, \Contractually
Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards," 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 171 (2003), pp. 171-200).
3We discuss the case of similarly biased experts in Section 6.
1action is represented by an uncertain state. The experts have unveriable information
about the state. In the rst part of the paper, we assume that the experts have identical
information and know the state. Later on, we allow the experts to have asymmetric infor-
mation. There are no monetary payments. A decision rule is a contract that implements
an action contingent on the experts' reports about their information.4 The purpose of the
paper is to identify optimal decision rules.
Consider an environment in which the experts have identical information. By the rev-
elation principle, an optimal decision rule can be sought for among direct decision rules
in which the experts reports their information truthfully. Thus, the decision rule must
provide incentives for the experts to tell the truth through punishment of disagreements.
The diculty here is that when a disagreement is observed, the designer cannot detect
which expert deviates from truthful reporting. Furthermore, the experts' opposing inter-
ests imply that an action that is a stronger punishment for one expert is often a weaker
punishment for the other one. In cheap talk communication models, where the decision
maker cannot commit to a decision rule, this issue causes punishments in fully revealing
equilibria to depend non-trivially on the experts' reports (Krishna and Morgan, 2001a,b;
Battaglini, 2002; Ambrus and Takahashi, 2008)5 and also makes it dicult to characterize
optimal equilibria if full revelation is not feasible.
Proposition 1 is the key insight of the paper. It oers a surprisingly simple way to
construct an optimal decision rule for a decision maker with commitment power: we show
that one can restrict attention to \constant-threat" rules in which every disagreement
between the experts is punished by the same (stochastic) action with a two point support.
The proof of this constant-threat result relies in a curious way on a minmax inequality
and concavity of the experts' payo functions.
For our introductory example, the constant-threat result suggests that the optimal
decision rule should entail a threat of random arbitration with a restricted scope of the
award to provide incentives for the parties to agree on the optimal course of action. Of
course, while fully random arbitration might be dicult to implement in practice, at least
some randomness and restrictions on the scope of the award can be welfare improving.
An optimal decision rule is constant and very simple across a large set of environments.
4This setting is reminiscent of Kalai and Rosenthal (1976) who address the question of implementation
through binding arbitration of an ecient outcome in a nite two-player game, where the arbitrator is
uninformed about the players' payo functions. The key dierence is that there is no exogenously specied
status-quo in our model.
5Crawford and Sobel (1982) is the seminal reference on cheap talk communication with one expert. For
models of cheap talk communication with two experts see also Krishna and Morgan (2001b); Battaglini
(2004); Ambrus and Lu (2009); Li (2008, 2009).
2It can be implemented by an indirect mechanism in which both experts suggest an action;
if they agree, the suggested recommendation is followed; otherwise, the rule (uniformly)
randomizes between the two most extreme actions. The class of environments in which this
decision rule is optimal includes those in which the rst best outcome can be implemented
(Corollary 1) and symmetric environments (Remark 2). This rule is robust to small
mistakes in specications of the experts' preferences and information. By contrast, the
constructions of optimal outcomes in cheap talk environments are highly sensitive to
these details of the model (Krishna and Morgan, 2001a; Battaglini, 2002; Ambrus and
Takahashi, 2008).6
The cheap talk literature with two experts has focused on establishing conditions under
which the decision maker can achieve the rst best outcome (Krishna and Morgan, 2001b;
Battaglini, 2002; Ambrus and Takahashi, 2008). For comparison, we provide conditions
(Proposition 2 and Remark 1) for the rst best to be implementable in our environment;
the conditions bound the size of bias of each expert. Naturally, these conditions are related
to but weaker than those in cheap talk environments. For suciently small biases, the
rst best can be attained both with and without commitment. In these circumstances,
the role of commitment is to permit a simpler and more robust decision rule. For the
intermediate range of biases, the role of commitment is stronger: the rst best could be
implemented only under commitment. In this case, the ability of the decision maker to
commit to a stochastic action out of equilibrium confers an additional benet.
Propositions 3 { 5 characterize optimal decision rules in the environments in which
the rst best outcome is not implementable. In particular, adding a second expert always
strictly improves the payo of the decision maker relative to what she would obtain with
one expert (Proposition 3). These results are especially useful because a characterization
of the best equilibria in cheap talk environments beyond those permitting the rst best
remains an open question for many environments.
The assumption that the experts have identical information is standard in the related
literature.7 Yet, it is an important assumption in that it allows the decision maker to
check the reports of the experts against each other, and inconsistent reports do not occur
on the equilibrium path. Therefore, we study noisy environments in Section 5. Our rst
observation is that the constant-threat result extends to these environments.8 Further-
6Furthermore, as pointed out by Battaglini (2002), these cheap talk equilibria contain implausible out-
of-equilibrium beliefs. By contrast, there is no issue of out-of-equilibrium beliefs in our model because
the decision maker can commit to her actions.
7See references in Section 5.
8Though it may become vacuous if in any state the experts' signals have full support.
3more, we show that if the state space is nite, then for any sequence of diminishing noise
it is possible to construct decision rules that converge to the optimal decision rule in the
environment without noise (Remarks 3 and 4). A similar result holds for the environments
in which the state space is innite and the noise is partitional: the experts observe an
element of a partition of the state space that contains the realized state (Proposition 6).
The proofs of these results are constructive and oer a way to design decision rules that
perform close to optimum in environments with small noise. They complement the results
in Ambrus and Lu (2009) who show how to construct fully revealing equilibria robust to
noise in cheap talk environments.
The results presented here focus on partial implementation of the optimal outcomes
and the constructed decision rules permit multiple equilibria. We discuss the issue of full
implementation and oer some partial positive results in Section 6.
This paper is a natural continuation of the work on optimal decision rules in envi-
ronments with one informed expert and no monetary payments that was initiated by
Holmstr om (1977, 1984).9 We compare our results with the optimal decision rules iden-
tied in this literature in Section 6.
Our paper is related to Battaglini (2004) who considers a multidimensional environ-
ment with multiple experts and noisy signals. Battaglini shows that minimal commitment
power is sucient to implement an outcome arbitrarily close to the rst best as the number
of experts becomes suciently high.
The problem of optimal decision rules for two experts has been studied in Martimort
and Semenov (2008). Our models and approaches are quite dierent. In particular, they
focus on experts who are biased in the same direction and consider dominant strategy im-
plementation. By contrast with our results, Martimort and Semenov (2008) demonstrate
impossibility of the rst best outcome and show that a suciently high bias renders the
experts not valuable for the decision maker.
Finally, Es o and Fong (2010) show that the rst best outcome can be implemented
in a dynamic cheap talk environment in which the decision maker can delay the nal
decision by choosing an \inaction". In their model, delays are costly: both experts prefer
9See Holmstr om (1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Dessein (2002), Martimort and Semenov
(2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Martimort and Semenov (2008), Goltsman et al. (2009), Ko-
vac and Mylovanov (2009), Amador and Bagwell (2010). Armstrong and Vickers (2008), Koessler and
Martimort (2009), Li and Li (2009), and Lim (2009) who study optimal decision rules in environments
which are related, but not identical to the model of Holmstr om (1977, 1984). Optimal decision rules for
environments in which a decision maker can commit to monetary payments are characterized in Baron
(2000), Krishna and Morgan (2008), Bester and Kr ahmer (2008), Raith (2008), and Ambrus and Egorov
(2009).
4the decision maker's ideal action to inaction. Our model is dierent in that we do not
assume existence of an outcome with properties of inaction in their model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
The constant-threat result is derived in Section 3. Applying this result, we characterize
the optimal decision rules in Section 4 for the environments with identical information
of the experts. Section 5 studies robustness of the optimal decision rules with respect to
noise in the experts' information. Section 6 discusses the questions of full implementation,
similarly biased experts, and compares the results with those for the environment with
one expert.
2 The Model
There are two experts i = 1;2 and a decision maker. The decision maker has to select an
action from a set Y = [0;1] of feasible actions. The most preferred action for the decision
maker (the state), x 2 X, is a realized value of a random variable ~ x with support on X.
We assume that X is a closed measurable subset of Y that contains the endpoints, 0 and
1. That is, our model includes both the environment in which the set of states is nite
and the environment in which the set of states is a compact interval. The restriction to
the unit interval is not essential.10
The decision maker is uninformed about x and believes that the distribution of ~ x is
represented by a c.d.f. F.
We begin with the assumption that the experts know precisely the value of x (it will
be relaxed in Section 5). The decision maker can ask for recommendations and commit
to take an action that is contingent on their reports.
Let y denote an action. The payo function of the decision maker is denoted by
u0(x;y) and the payo functions of expert i = 1;2 by ui(x;y). We assume that for every
x 2 X each function ui(x;y), i = 0;1;2, is strictly concave in y. The decision maker's
payo function is maximized at the action equal to the state,
argmax
y2Y
u0(x;y) = fxg; x 2 X:
For every x 2 X we dene fy
i(x)g = argmaxy2Y ui(x;y), i = 1;2. We assume that the
10The assumption that the action space is bounded does not drive our results and can be relaxed. In
fact, a larger action space makes eliciting information easier for the decision maker. Ultimately, if the
action space is unbounded or suciently large relative to the state space, the rst best outcome can be
implemented by threatening experts with extreme actions out of equilibrium.
5experts have opposing interests:
y

1(x) < x < y

2(x); for every x 2 X: (1)
Some of our results are obtained for the environment with quadratic preferences and xed
biases, which is standard in the literature on experts: u0(x;y) =  (x   y)2, u1(x;y) =
 ((x   b1)   y)2 and u2(x;y) =  ((x + b2)   y)2, where b1;b2 > 0.
Let Y denote the set of distributions on Y (randomized actions). Identifying point




ui(x;y)(dy); x 2 X;  2 Y:
A decision rule is a measurable function
 : X
2 ! Y; (x1;x2) 7! (x1;x2);
where (x1;x2) is a randomized action that is contingent on the experts' reports (x1;x2).
A decision rule induces a game (a direct mechanism), in which after observing x the
experts simultaneously make reports x1;x2 2 X and the outcome (x1;x2) is implemented.
A decision rule  is incentive compatible if truthtelling, x1 = x2 = x, is a Nash






By the revelation principle, any equilibrium outcome of the experts' interaction in a
game whose space of outcomes is Y or Y can be represented by the truth-telling equilib-
rium outcome in some incentive compatible decision rule. In what follows, we will consider
only incentive compatible decision rules.






among all incentive compatible decision rules. Since the set of incentive compatible de-
cision rules is compact in weak topology and v is continuous in , an optimal decision
rule exists.
63 The Constant-threat Result
In any decision rule, the main incentive issue is to motivate each expert to agree with the
other expert who is expected to tell the truth. Therefore, the decision rule must punish
disagreements. The diculty here is that if a disagreement is observed (i) it is unclear
which expert, if any, tells the truth, and (ii) since the experts have opposing interests, a
punishment that is more severe for one of the experts tends to benet the other expert.
As a result, a punishment after a disagreement may depend non-trivially on the experts'
reports. In particular, this is so in the existing constructions of optimal outcomes in cheap
talk environments (Krishna and Morgan, 2001b; Battaglini, 2002; Ambrus and Takahashi,
2008).
We now prove our key result, the constant-threat result, which allows us to characterize
optimal decision rules. It states that one can restrict attention to decision rules in which
the lottery implemented after a disagreement has support on extreme actions 0 and 1
and is independent of the reports. This result reduces the problem of nding optimal
decision rules to the problem of nding actions that are implemented if the experts report
their information truthfully, (x;x), and the probability of implementing y = 1 after a
disagreement. Thus, it drastically decreases complexity of the design problem, because
we avoid the optimization problem in which we search on a continuum of lotteries with
support on Y that are implemented after a disagreement (one threat lottery for each pair
of reports x1;x2 2 X;x1 6= x2).
The idea behind the constant-threat result is as follows. First, by concavity of the
experts' payo functions, any lottery over actions implemented after a disagreement can
be replaced, using a mean-preserving spread, by a lottery between actions 0 and 1 without
aecting the experts' incentives to report the truth.
Now, let  be a decision rule in which a disagreement always results in a lottery with
support f0;1g. The crucial step in the proof is to observe that, say, expert 1 (who is
left-biased) always prefers action x to the extreme right action 1. Hence, in all states
where a disagreement lottery is better than x, his payo from action 0 must be strictly
greater than that from x. It follows that in these states his expected payo from that
lottery must be decreasing in the probability assigned on action 1 (similarly, the payo
of expert 2 from a disagreement lottery must be increasing in the probability assigned on
action 1). Let r be the lottery that achieves the highest payo for expert 1 among the
lotteries with support f0;1g that can be achieved by the best deviations of expert 1 in
various states x 2 X. Denote by p the probability this lottery assigns to action 1. Dene
p for expert 2 analogously. The result now follows from the observation that p  p, which
7relies on the fact that minmax is larger than or equal to maxmin. Hence, there exists a
lottery c that assigns probability pc to action 1, where p  pc  p, such that replacing
every threat lottery with c does not violate the incentive constraints of the experts.
Let Y be the set of probability distributions with support on f0;1g. We say that a
decision rule  = (x1;x2) is constant-threat if it is incentive compatible and
(C) there exists c 2 Y such that (x1;x2) = c whenever x1 6= x2.
We say that two incentive compatible decision rules,  and 0, are equivalent if they
implement the same action whenever the reports of the experts coincide, i.e., (x;x) =
0(x;x) for all x 2 X. Thus, two equivalent decision rules implement identical actions in
equilibrium, but may implement dierent actions o-equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Constant-threat result) For every optimal decision rule there exists
an equivalent constant-threat decision rule.
Note that a constant-threat decision rule which is equivalent to some optimal decision
rule must be optimal as well, since it implements the same actions in equilibrium.
Proof. Let  be an optimal decision rule. Observe that by concavity of ui(x;y) in y,












ui(x;1); x 2 X:
Hence, replacing (x1;x2), x1 6= x2, by a lottery that puts probability
R
y(x1;x2)(dy)
on action 1 and the complementary probability on action 0 will not violate the incentive
constraints of the experts. Therefore, there exists an equivalent decision rule 0 in which
every threat lottery implemented after a disagreement has support on f0;1g.
We now show that there exists a constant-threat decision rule c equivalent to 0. For
every pair of dierent reports, x1;x2 2 X;x1 6= x2, let P(x1;x2) be the probability that
0(x1;x2) assigns to 1 after a disagreement. We extend the denition of P(;) to X2 by
setting P(x;x) =
R
y0(x;x)(dy) for all x 2 X. Dene
P1(x) = fP(x
0;x)jx
0 2 Xg and P2(x) = fP(x;x
0)jx
0 2 Xg:
For all x 2 X, p 2 [0;1], and i = 1;2 let
Di(x;p) = maxf0;pui(x;1) + (1   p)ui(x;0)   ui(x;(x;x))g:
8By construction, a deviation by expert i in state x leading to a lottery in Y that assigns
probability p 2 [0;1] to action 1 is non-protable i Di(x;p) = 0. Furthermore, by
denition of P(x;x),
Di(x;P(x;x)) = 0; x 2 X;i = 1;2:
Thus, incentive constraints (2) can be written as
Di(x;p) = 0; x 2 X; p 2 Pi(x); i = 1;2: (IC)
We now show that
D1(x;p) is non-increasing in p for every x 2 X;
D2(x;p) is non-decreasing in p for every x 2 X:
(*)
We start by showing that we can restrict attention to decision rules that on the equilibrium
path are deterministic and implement actions that are bounded by the experts' most
preferred actions,
(x;x) 2 Y; y

1(x)  (x;x)  y

2(x); x 2 X: (P3)
To see why this is true, x some x0 2 X and suppose rst that (x0;x0) is a proper lottery.
Then, concavity of the payo functions implies that replacing (x0;x0) with the expected
value of this lottery improves the payos of all players without violating any incentive
constraints. Next, let (x0;x0) = y0 2 Y , y0 > y
2(x0) for some x0 2 X. Since y
2(x0) is
closer than y0 to the most preferred alternatives of all players, concavity of the payo
functions implies that setting (x0;x0) = y
2(x0) improves the payos of all parties on the
equilibrium path without violating incentive constraints. A symmetric argument is valid
for (x0;x0) = y0 < y
1(x).
Since u1(x;y) is concave in y and y
1(x)  (x;x) by (P3), it follows that u1(x;y) is
decreasing in y on [(x;x);1] for every x, and hence
u1(x;(x;x))  u1(x;1):
If, in addition, u1(x;(x;x))  u1(x;0), then, D1(x;p) = 0 for every p 2 [0;1]. On
the other hand, if u1(x;(x;x)) < u1(x;0), then u1(x;1) < u1(x;0), and hence D1(x;p) is
decreasing in p. This establishes the rst statement in (*). The argument for the second
9statement is analogous.
Next, let
a1(x) = inf P1(x); x 2 X;
a2(x) = supP2(x); x 2 X:
By (IC) and continuity of D(x;p) w.r.t. p, we have Di(x;ai(x)) = 0 for x 2 X. By (*),
D1(x;p) = 0; p  a1(x); x 2 X;























Then, there exists pc such that p  pc  p. By (3),
Di(x;p
c) = 0; x 2 X;i = 1;2:
The result now follows from (IC).
The result in Proposition 1 can be generalized. We say that an incentive compatible
decision rule is undominated if there does not exist another incentive compatible decision
rule that yields to all players a greater (equilibrium) payo in every state and a strictly
greater payo in some state. The arguments behind Proposition 1 are not aected if we
consider undominated decision rules instead of optimal decision rules.
In the remainder of the paper, we will study optimal decision rules in the set of
constant-threat decision rules. Typically, however, there exist decision rules that induce
the same equilibrium outcome and are not constant-threat.
Finally, we would like to remark on the multiplicity of equilibria in the constant-threat
decision rules. In this paper, we focus on the truthtelling equilibria; this is justied by
the revelation principle. At the same time, there are many other equilibria in a given
constant-threat decision rule. For instance, there is always a \babbling" equilibrium in
which, irrespective of the true state, both experts report some x0 2 X such that (x0;x0)
10is equal to the expected value of the threat lottery.11
4 Optimal Decision Rules
The constant-threat result in Proposition 1 makes characterization of optimal constant-
threat decision rules a simple exercise. In this section, we use it to characterize these rules
and obtain more specic results under some additional assumptions about the environ-
ment.
4.1 First Best Decision Rules
We start our analysis of optimal constant-threat decision rules by identifying conditions
under which they implement the most preferred alternative of the decision maker. Let C
be the set of incentive compatible constant-threat decision rules. A decision rule in C that
in each state implements the most preferred action for the decision maker, if it exists, is
called rst best.
We assume that each expert's utility depend only on the distance between her most
preferred action and the implemented action: for each i = 1;2
ui(x;y) =  di(y   (x + bi(x))); (4)
where di : R ! R+ is a convex dierentiable function which achieves its minimum at zero
and which is symmetric around zero, i.e., di(z) = di( z) for all z 2 R, and bi : X ! R,
i = 1;2, b1(x) < 0 < b2(x). The point x + bi(x) is the most preferred action of i in state
x. The values of b1 and b2 re
ect the con
ict of preferences between the experts and the
decision maker and are called the experts' biases.
The next result provides a sucient condition for existence of the rst best decision
rule under these assumptions.




11We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6, where we show that the decision rules identied in this
paper can be modied to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome if the experts have lexicographic
preferences for truthful reporting.
11Proof. There exists the rst best decision rule if and only if there is p 2 [0;1] such that
for each expert i = 1;2 and for every x 2 X,
ui(x;x)  (1   p)ui(x;0) + pui(x;1): (5)











1   x   bi(x)
2

= di(1=2)  di(bi(x)); (6)
where the second inequality follows from the assumption that sup
x2X;i=1;2
jbi(x)j  1=2. Ob-
serve that (6) is equivalent to (5) with p = 1=2, which implies existence of the rst best
decision rule with the threat lottery that assigns equal probabilities to 0 and 1.
The rst best decision rule constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 uses as a threat
the lottery that mixes with equal probability between 0 and 1. The logic behind the
construction is straightforward: if the experts' biases are not too large, they are better o
under the decision maker's most preferred alternative rather than the threat lottery. It is
interesting to note that a symmetric threat lottery is optimal even if the experts' biases
are not equal.
Under some additional structure of the payo functions, the sucient condition in
Proposition 2 becomes necessary.
Remark 1 Let12 X = [0;1] and assume that the biases are constant, bi(x) = ~ bi, i = 1;2,
and have the opposite signs, ~ b1 < 0 < ~ b2. Then there does not exist the rst best decision
rule whenever maxj~ bij > 1=2.
Proof. Assume that ~ b2 > 1=2. First, let p > 0. Then,
(1   p)d2(~ b2) + pd2(1  ~ b2) < (1   p)d2(~ b2) + pd2(~ b2) = d2(~ b2);
which contradicts (5) for x = 0 and i = 2. Next, let p = 0. Since ~ b1 < 0, we obtain for x
that satises 0 < x < j~ b1j
u1(x;0)   d1( x  ~ b1) >  d1(~ b1)  u1(x;x);
12In fact, it suces to assume that X contains arbitrarily small neighborhoods in [0;1] of the endpoints
0 and 1.
12which contradicts (5) for i = 1. The argument for ~ b1 <  1=2 is symmetric.
The above results are related to Krishna and Morgan (2001a), Battaglini (2002), and
Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) who study cheap talk communication with two experts. For
the environment considered in Remark 1, Proposition 1 in Battaglini (2002) establishes
that a necessary and sucient condition for a fully revealing cheap talk equilibrium is
that the sum of the absolute values of the experts' biases is less than half of the measure
of the action space.13 Proposition 2 and Remark 1 complement this result by providing
necessary and sucient conditions for the rst best outcome under commitment. Our
condition is weaker and it bounds the size of each expert's bias rather than their sum;
interestingly, the value of the bound is the same in both environments.
The construction of fully revealing equilibria in cheap talk and our construction of a
rst best decision rule are analogous but not identical. In a cheap talk environment, for
any pair of disagreeing reports there is a threat action such that an expert who can induce
this pair of reports prefers the rst best outcome to the threat action. This threat action
is supported by (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs that make it optimal. The proof then veries
that for each pair of states (reports) there exists a threat action that satises a number of
inequalities that depend on biases of the experts; in equilibrium, the threat action might
have to depend non-trivially and discontinuously on the reports of the experts.
By contrast, in our model a decision rule can use lotteries as threat actions that cannot
be supported in a cheap talk model, even out of equilibrium.14 The proof of the possibility
of the rst best in our environment employs a constant-threat lottery that mixes equally
between the extreme actions and makes use of concavity property of payo functions.
Furthermore, the proof of the necessary condition relies on the fact that it is sucient to
consider report-independent threat lotteries.
4.2 Robustness of the First Best Decision Rule
An interesting implication of the above results is that the lottery that mixes between 0
and 1 with equal probability is a sucient threat for implementing the rst best if the
biases are not too large. This is so even if the biases are not symmetric.
13Krishna and Morgan (2001a) prove that a sucient condition for a fully revealing cheap talk equi-
librium in an environment with constant and equal opposing biases is that each expert's bias is less than
1/4.
14The concavity of payo functions implies that a lottery cannot be a best response for the decision
maker.
13Corollary 1 Let the conditions in Proposition 2 be satised. Then, the rst best decision
rule is constant in the preferences of the experts.
The constancy of the optimal decision rule is a useful feature if the decision maker
is concerned about robustness of the decision rule with respect to her knowledge of the
environment. In particular, if the optimal decision rule is constant, then the decision
maker need not possess correct knowledge about the magnitude and the direction of the
experts' biases.
4.3 Second Best Decision Rules
What are the properties of an optimal decision rule if the rst best outcome cannot be
implemented? In what follows, we characterize optimal decision rules that, given the
threat lottery, maximize the payo of the decision maker in each state.15
Observe that any decision rule in C can be identied by a pair
(p;g) : p 2 [0;1]; g : X ! Y;
where p is the probability of action 1 after a disagreement and g(x) is the action imple-
mented on the equilibrium path (recall that decision rules in C have lotteries with support
on f0;1g).16
Assume that X = [0;1]. Let us pick a constant-threat decision rule (p;g) in C. By
concavity of payo functions, both experts prefer y = x in state x = p to the threat
lottery,
ui(p;p)  pui(p;1) + (1   p)ui(p;0):
This implies that an optimal decision rule implements the most preferred alternative for
the decision maker, g(x) = x, at least in state x = p. In addition, since the experts'
payo functions are strictly concave, we obtain g(x) = x for a proper interval containing
p 2 (0;1).
Proposition 3 Let X = [0;1]. Then, an optimal decision rule implements the most
preferred alternative of the decision maker on an interval of states.
This observation highlights the value of two experts for the decision maker. Clearly,
the decision maker is weakly better o with two experts than with either of them alone
15Trivially, there also exists a continuum of other decision rules that deliver the same expected payo
for the decision maker but do not have this property for a set of states of measure zero.
16We ignore decision rules in C that are stochastic on the equilibrium path as they cannot be optimal.
14as she can always implement a decision rule that would be optimal in the environment
with one expert ignoring the existence of the other. However, that the decision maker is
strictly better o with two experts is particularly clear if their biases are high: Whereas
there is no value in employing one expert if she is suciently biased,17 with two experts
there exists a decision rule which implements the most preferred action of the decision
maker at least in some states.
We now describe the structure of an optimal decision rule in states where the rst best
outcome is not incentive compatible. For a given probability p of action 1 in an optimal
constant-threat decision rule, let ~ X
p
i be the set of states in which expert i strictly prefers
the threat lottery to the decision maker's most preferred action,
~ X
p
i = fx 2 [0;1] : ui(x;x) <  ui(x;p)g;
where  ui(x;p) is expert i's expected payo from the threat lottery p,
 ui(x;p) = (1   p)ui(x;0) + pui(x;1):
Hence, ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2 is the set of states where implementing the most preferred action is not
incentive compatible.
Lemma 1 For any state x in ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2, the incentive constraint of only one of the experts
is violated, i.e., ~ X
p
1 \ ~ X
p
2 = ?.
Proof. By assumption, the experts have opposing interests, i.e., y
1(x) < x < y
2(x). If
p > x, then expert 1 prefers action x to action y = p and hence to the threat lottery.
Otherwise, expert 2 prefers x to the threat lottery. Hence, at least one expert prefers x
to the threat lottery.
An optimal decision rule stipulates to choose action g(x) that is the \closest" point
to x (from the perspective of the decision maker) subject to the incentive constraints for
the experts. Since at every state x 2 ~ X
p





17To see why this is true, imagine that the experts are suciently biased such that one expert prefers
action 0 and the other one prefers action 1 regardless of the state. In this environment, any decision rule
with one expert will implement the same action in all states. Hence, with just one expert her information
cannot aect the action of the decision maker.
154.4 Quadratic Preferences and Constant Biases
We can obtain stronger results if we impose additional structure on the preferences of the
experts. Specically, we make the assumption, which is standard in the literature, that
the experts' preferences can be represented by a quadratic payo function with a constant
bias,
ui(x;y) =  (y   (x + bi))
2; i = 1;2; (7)
where b1 < 0 < b2. Assume also u0(x;y) =  (y   x)2 and X = [0;1].
In order to determine the set ~ X
p
i of states where expert i prefers threat lottery p to the
most preferred action x for the decision maker, we solve the inequality ui(x;x) <  ui(x;p).
Using (7) we obtain
(1   p)(x + bi)




In order to state the result, the following denitions are in order. For any p 2 X, let
Di = b2
i   p(1   p) and let
x
p




i = p   bi +
p
Di: (9)




























The next result describes the structure of an optimal decision rule.
Proposition 4 Let (p;g) be an optimal constant-threat decision rule. Then,
g(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
x   jb1j +
p
  u1(x;p); if x 2 ~ X
p
1;
x + jb2j  
p




Proof. If x 62 ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2, then the rst best action is incentive compatible, g(x) = x.
Let x 2 ~ X
p
1 (the argument for x 2 ~ X
p
2 will be analogous). In an optimal decision rule
the decision maker implements an action g(x) that minimizes the distance to x, subject








Figure 1: An optimal decision rule with quadratic preferences, jb1j = jb2j = 1, p = 1=2.






(y   (x + b1))
2  (1   p)(x + b1)
2 + p(1   (x + b1))
2:
Solving the above inequality for y we obtain
y 2 [0;1]n

x + b1  
p





Since x 2 ~ X
p
1, the above constraint must be binding. As b1 < 0 by assumption, the closest
action to x is g(x) = x+b1 +
p
  u1(x;p). It is straightforward to verify that in this case
g(x) 2 ~ X
p
1. As ~ X
p
1 \ ~ X
p
2 = ?, the incentive constraint for expert 2 is satised as well.
If the absolute value of each of the biases is greater than 1=2, an optimal decision













1], both experts prefer the decision maker's most preferred
action to the threat lottery, and the rst best outcome is achieved (the points along the 45
line on Fig. 1). For the \extreme left" states in [0;x
p
2), expert 2 strictly prefers the threat
17lottery to x, and hence the decision maker implements an action that is closer to expert
2's most preferred action. The distortion for the \extreme right" states is analogous.
The result in Proposition 4 allows us to transfer the problem of nding an optimal







where gp, with some abuse of notation, is given by Proposition 4.
In contrast to the rst best decision rule, in second-best decision rules the optimal value
of the threat point depends on the distribution of the state x. In general, there is no closed
form solution for optimal threat points. Nevertheless, under additional assumptions, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Let the experts' biases be opposing and equal,  b1 = b2 = b, and distribu-
tion of x be symmetric, i.e., F(1 x) = 1 F(x), x 2 [0;1]. Then there exists an optimal
decision rule with p = 1=2.
Proof. Note that under conditions of Proposition 5, p = 1=2 must be an extreme point of
the expression in (10) due to full symmetry of the problem w.r.t. 1=2. What remains to
prove is that p = 1=2 is the minimum of (10). The full proof is deferred to the Appendix.
Remark 2 Let the conditions of Proposition 5 hold. Then, the actions implemented on
the equilibrium path in the optimal decision rule depend on the value of b. Nevertheless,
the outcome of this decision rule can be implemented by the following indirect decision
rule that is constant in b: The experts recommend an action. If their recommendations
coincide, the action is taken. Otherwise, a threat lottery with p = 1=2 is implemented.
5 Continuity and Noise
5.1 Positive Results
The assumption that both experts are perfectly informed is common in the literature
that studies cheap talk communication with two experts in payo environments similar
to the one in this paper. It has been made, for example, in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989),
Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b), Battaglini (2002), Levy and Razin (2007), Ambrus and
18Takahashi (2008), and Li (2008, 2009).18
Nevertheless, this assumption is important because it ensures that any disagreement in
experts' reports is evidence of out-of-equilibrium behavior. The optimal constant-threat
decision rule might perform poorly if the experts' information about the state is noisy,
since any non-identical albeit truthful reports are punished by a threat lottery.
This diculty created by noise is not specic to the environment with commitment
and, moreover, can have signicant implications: e.g., cheap talk equilibria attaining the
rst best outcome are not robust to arbitrarily small amount of noise (Levy and Razin,
2007). The question of robustness to noise of these equilibria has been studied in Battaglini
(2004) and Ambrus and Lu (2009). In a model with multiple experts, a multidimensional
environment, and noisy signals, Battaglini (2004) shows that minimal commitment power
is sucient for the rst best outcome to become feasible in the limit as the number of
experts increases. Ambrus and Lu (2009) construct fully revealing equilibria that are
robust to a small amount of noise in environments in which the state space is suciently
large relative to the size of the experts' biases.
In this section, we establish two results. First, if the state space is nite, then either
the optimal constant-threat decision rule is robust to small amount of noise or there exists
a constant-threat decision rule that implements an outcome arbitrarily close to that in
the optimal decision rule as noise vanishes. Second, for environments with continuous
state spaces and noisy signals that can be modeled as in Aumann (1976) by elements
of a partition of the state space, we can construct a sequence of what we call denite
punishment decision rules that are incentive compatible and converge to the optimal
decision rule for vanishing noise. These results are valuable as they underscore that
commitment can restore continuity of optimal decision rules with respect to noise and
suggest how one can construct decision rules that are robust to small noise.
Unfortunately, we do not have a continuity result for arbitrary noise structures if the
state space is continuous or innite. Therefore, the question whether the continuity result
is specic to nite state space remains open. Nevertheless, since a general continuity
result is not the main focus of this paper and it would be valuable to explore it in the
environments more general than the one studied here, we leave the question for future
research.
Model. We consider a model in which the experts' information is incomplete and not
18The experts are imperfectly informed in the models of Austen-Smith (1993), Wolinsky (2002), and
Battaglini (2004). See also Li and Suen (2009) for a survey of work on decision making in committees;
this literature often assumes that dierent members of the committee hold distinct pieces of information.
19identical. We assume that, instead of observing the state, each expert observes an infor-
mative signal si 2 X, i = 1;2, about the state. The denition of the decision rule remains
unchanged. A decision rule is incentive compatible if truthful reporting of signals is an
equilibrium. The rest of the model is same as before.
The amount of noise is measured by Ky Fan metric
i = inf
 f > 0 : Pr(jsi   xj > jx)   for all x 2 Xg:
We say that the amount of noise vanishes if i ! 0;i = 1;2.
Finite X. In a nite state space, an optimal constant-threat decision rule in the envi-
ronment without noise in which the experts' incentive constraints are satised with strict
inequality remains incentive compatible for small amount of noise. Furthermore, in each
state it implements the same action as in the environment without noise with probabil-
ity uniformly converging to one as maxf1;2g ! 0. Finally, note that if the optimal
constant-threat decision rule satises incentive constraints with strict inequality in each
state, then this rule must be rst best. We collect these observations in the following
remark.
Remark 3 Let X be nite and assume that there exists the rst best decision rule. If
the incentive compatibility constraints are satised with strict inequality for each x 2 X,
then the rst best decision rule is incentive compatible for a suciently small noise and
its outcome is state-wise uniformly continuous in the amount of noise.
Consider now an environment in which the incentive constraints in the optimal decision
rule hold with equality for some states. This rule may cease to be incentive compatible
for an arbitrarily small amount of noise. Nevertheless, it can be shown using Lemma
1 that in the optimal constant-threat decision rule in each state there is a slack in the
incentive constraint for at least one expert. Therefore, we can always distort the action
in each state in favor of the expert whose incentive constraint is binding in order to make
incentives strict for both experts. Clearly, this distortion can be made arbitrarily small.
The distorted decision rule is incentive compatible for suciently small noise.
Remark 4 Let X be nite. Then, for any  > 0, there exists a constant-threat decision
rule, which
(i) is incentive compatible for a suciently small amount of noise,
(ii) its outcome is state-wise uniformly continuous in the amount of noise, and
20(iii) in the limit without noise, in each state it implements an action that is at most 
away from the action that is implemented in the optimal constant-threat decision
rule.
Continuous X and partitional noise. Let X = [0;1]. Following Aumann (1976), assume
that an expert's information can be represented as an element of a partition of X.
For i = 1;2, let ni = ft1
i;:::;t
K 1
i g, where t1






i < 1, be an ordered se-






Expert i observes the element of i which contains the realized state.19
Let  be the meet of 1 and 2, that is, the set of all non-empty intersections of
the elements of these sets. Given a partitional information structure, a decision rule is
a mapping  : 1  2 ! Y. The denition of incentive compatibility is standard and
the revelation principle applies. A constant-threat decision rule in this environment is
a triple (^ ;g;p), where ^   , g : ^  ! Y , and p 2 [0;1]. For every pair of reports
(1;2) 2 12, we say that experts \agree on 1\2" if 1\2 2 ^ , in which case the
decision rule implements g(1 \ 2) 2 Y ; otherwise we say that experts \disagree" and
the decision rule implements the (constant-threat) lottery in Y that assigns probability
p on extreme action 1.
Remark 5 For every optimal decision rule, there exists an equivalent constant-threat
decision rule.
Proof. The constant-threat result is veried following the proof of Proposition 1.
If 1 = 2 = , then the experts have identical information. The model is equivalent
to that with discrete states and perfectly informed experts.
Remark 6 If the experts have the same information, 1 = 2, then the decision maker's
payo in the optimal decision rule converges to her maximal payo in the environment






Proof. The proof is direct and therefore omitted.
For the remainder of the section, we focus on experts with dierent information,
1 6= 2. In a truthtelling equilibrium in this environment, a lie cannot always be
19For convenience, we assume that the cardinality of partitions is the same across experts. The argu-
ments in this section can be extended to accommodate dierent size partitions, but it will signicantly
increase notational burden.
21detected with certainty. As a result, there are additional incentive constraints aecting
the structure of optimal decision rules. To keep the presentation focused, we refrain
from a full characterization of optimal decision rules for dierent information structures.
Instead, we oer a construction of an incentive compatible decision rule that converges to
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1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4 = 1
Figure 2: Construction of l;l sequence.
In order to describe the denite punishment decision rule, we rst dene a sequence
l;l. Set 0 = 0 = 0. For l  1, we dene l and l by induction. Let ^ ti = minkftk
i 2
ni[f1gjtk
i > l 1g. Without loss of generality assume that ^ t1  ^ t2. Then, set l = ^ t2 and
l = maxkftk
1 2 n1 [ f1gjtk
1  lg. The induction stops when l = 1 and l is dened as
above. Figure 2 depicts an example of a sequence l;l.
Fix a threat lottery p. A denite punishment decision rule with a threat lottery p is
dened as follows. If experts reports (1;2) 2 1  2 are inconsistent, 1 \ 2 = ?,
or consistent but 1 \ 2  [l;l) for some l, then the decision rule implements the
threat lottery. Otherwise, if the experts' reports are consistent and 1 \ 2  [l;l+1)
for some l, the decision rule implements the action that maximizes the expected payo
of the decision maker conditional on the state being in [l;l+1) subject to the constraint
that both experts prefer this action to the threat lottery given their information. By
construction, if both experts report their elements of partitions truthfully, any deviation
of an expert either does not aect the action or results in the threat lottery. Therefore,
the decision rule is incentive compatible.




2j ! 0. Then, there exists a sequence of denite pun-
ishment decision rules that converges to the optimal constant-threat decision rule in the
environment in which the experts have identical information.
Proof. To construct the sequence it is sucient to pick the threat lottery in the optimal
constant-threat decision rule in the limit environment where the experts have identical





entails jl   lj ! 0 for all l, and hence the distribution of actions implemented on the
equilibrium path converges to the distribution of actions in the limit environment.
Given the partitional information structure, the out-of-equilibrium lies cannot be de-
tected with certainty. The idea behind our construction in Proposition 6 is to ensure
that any deviation from truthful reporting, even if it cannot be detected with certainty,
results in a punishment lottery. Clearly, this requires that the decision rule must punish
the experts on the equilibrium path in some states. This is costly but as the experts' in-
formation becomes more aligned, the probability of punishment on the equilibrium path
converges to zero.
Continuous X and replacement noise. A special feature of partitional information struc-
ture is that there exist pairs of reports that are incompatible with truthful reporting. If,
by contrast, the signals of the experts' have full support in each state, all combinations
of experts' reports are consistent with truthful reporting. The main result of this paper
{ the constant-threat result { will hold but become vacuous in such environments.
Nevertheless, constant-threat rules in which incentives are strict for both experts may
be robust to some types of noise with full support: Ambrus and Lu (2009, Section 5.3)
consider our constant-threat decision rules in an environment with the replacement noise,
in which each expert observes a signal that is equal to the state with some probability and
is uninformative with the complementary probability. They show that if the rst best is
implementable, then the corresponding constant-threat rule is incentive compatible in an
environment with small replacement noise and continuous in the amount of noise.
5.2 Continuity of Optimal Decision Rule for X = [0;1].
Constant-threat decision rules are discontinuous in the experts' reports because an ar-
bitrarily small disagreement between experts results in a punishment lottery. This dis-
continuity property per se may be a source of concern even in environments in which
23the experts have identical information if experts could make minor mistakes or there is
exogenous noise added to their reports as in Blume et al. (2007). However, in these en-
vironments constant-threat decision rules could be modied and made continuous at the
cost for the decision maker that becomes arbitrarily small as the noise vanishes.
Let X = [0;1]. Fix a constant-threat decision rule  and assume that incentive





Construct a new decision rule 0 as follows. If both reports coincide, there is no change.
Otherwise, the decision rule is a compounded lottery that implements the threat lottery
with probability (x1;x2) and the action corresponding to the average of the two reports
with the complementary probability. That is,










It is straightforward to verify that this decision rule is continuous in (x1;x2) and incentive
compatible for a small enough ", where " could be interpreted as a measure of mistakes
or distortions in the experts' reports during information transmission.
6 Discussion
6.1 Full Implementation
The paper characterizes optimal decision rules that are partially implementable: the
constructed decision rules permit equilibria other than truthtelling. Full implementation
of the optimal decision rule outcome as a unique equilibrium outcome is impossible in our
environment because a necessary condition of Maskin monotonicity (see Dutta and Sen,
1991) is not satised.
Nevertheless, if the experts have a lexicographic preference for telling the truth, as
in Dutta and Sen (2010),20 full implementation is feasible. For instance, consider an
environment in which the experts know the state and assume that the rst best outcome
is partially implementable by a constant-threat decision rule with a threat lottery p. Then,
20That is, if an expert is asked to report her information, then among all reports that implement the
same outcome as the truthful report does she strictly prefers the latter.
24it can be fully implemented by the following mechanism:21 Each expert reports a triple
(xi;yi;zi), interpreted as: \The true state is xi, but I would like yi to be implemented,"
and zi is a positive integer. There are three contigencies to consider.
(i) If y1 = y2 = y0, then y0 is implemented.
(ii) If y1 6= y2 and xi = yi for at least one of the experts, then the threat lottery p is
implemented.
(iii) If y1 6= y2 and xi 6= yi for both experts, then the \integer game" is played: whoever
has a greater integer zi gets the requested action yi.
Let true state be x. Then every Nash equilibrium leads to implementation of x and
is characterized by xi = yi = x and zi is arbitrary, i = 1;2. To see why this is a Nash
equilibrium, observe that any unilateral deviation either does not aect the outcome, or
results in the threat lottery p which is inferior to x for each expert. To see why there
are no other Nash equilibria, rst, observe that miscoordination, y1 6= y2, cannot occur
in equilibrium. If xi 6= yi for at least one of the experts, a deviation that results in the
\integer game" is possible, where the deviant chooses a large enough integer and gets
the most preferred action. If xi = yi for both experts, then one can deviate to xi = x,
which does not aect the outcome (the threat lottery is still implemented) but makes
the deviant better o since she reports the truth. Finally, a coordination on an action
y0 dierent from true state x is not an equilibrium either, since one of the experts can
deviate to xi = x, which does not aect the outcome (action y0 is still implemented) but
makes the deviant better o since she reports the truth.
6.2 Similarly Biased Experts
In our paper, the experts are biased in dierent directions (c.f., (1)) and the decision
maker does not have a choice over the experts available to him. This assumption could
be applicable in, e.g., legislative politics where experts represent lobbyists or politicians
with dierent ideologies, political economy of taris where experts represent dierent
governments, or organizational economics where experts could be employees of dierent
departments. If the experts are biased in the same direction, e.g., they always prefer
an action higher than the decision maker's optimal action, then the decision maker can
always implement the rst best outcome: The decision rule that threatens the experts
21This mechanism is simpler than the one in Dutta and Sen (2010).
25to implement y = 0 whenever they disagree will achieve the desired outcome. Although
we do not provide formal analysis, one disadvantage of the environment with similarly
biased experts might be that it is naturally prone to collusion: In the above decision
rule, the experts can coordinate to bias their reports upward; this would benet both
experts. In the environment with experts biased in dierent directions, any agreement to
bias reports would benet one expert at the expense of the other one, and hence collusion
is less compelling. These considerations can be important in practice making consulting
similarly biased experts less attractive.
6.3 Optimal Decision Rules with One Expert
In this subsection, we comment on the dierence between optimal decision rules in our
model and in a model with one expert only. Without a second expert, the recommenda-
tions to the decision maker by the rst expert remain unchecked. Therefore, the relevant
incentive constraints are with respect to other actions that can be induced by the ex-
pert's reports rather than with respect to the outcome resulting from a disagreement
with another expert. Consequently, optimal decision rules have a number of dierences:
There is bunching of implemented actions across states with one expert (Proposition 3 in
Alonso and Matouschek (2008), and Proposition 1 in Kovac and Mylovanov (2009)) and
no bunching with two experts (Proposition 4). With one expert, optimal decision rules do
not implement rst best actions because this cannot be made incentive compatible (see,
e.g., Proposition 1 in Kovac and Mylovanov (2009)). This is not so with two experts:
there is always a nonempty subset of states where the rst best outcome is implemented
(Propositions 2{3 in this paper). Furthermore, in the model with one expert the opti-
mal decision rule implements the expert's most preferred action for a positive measure of
states (Proposition 3 in Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Proposition 1 in Kovac and
Mylovanov (2009)). Again, this is not so with two experts (Propositions 2 and 4).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5. For b  1=2 the statement holds trivially, since the rst best
decision rule can be constructed (see Proposition 2 and its proof).
Assume b > 1=2. Let (p;gp) be a constant-threat decision rule, where gp is described
in Proposition 4. By an argument presented in Section 4.4, if both biases are greater than



































Recall that ui(x;p) =  (1   p)(x + bi)2   p(1   (x + bi))2 and, by (9), x
p




2   p(1   p) and x
p
1 = p   b1  
p
b2
1   p(1   p). Using the symmetry assumption
b1 =  b2 = b, we obtain that x
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2dF(x):
Next, using the assumption F(x) = 1   F(1   x) that entails dF(x) = dF(1   x), after




















Let us now dierentiate v(p;gp) with respect to p. Observe that  u2( x
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well dened and equal to zero. An analogous statement holds for  x
1 p
2 . Thus, derivatives
w.r.t. bounds of integration are ignored, and after dening h(x) =
@u2(x;p)





























It is straightforward to check that @
@pv(p;g)jp= 1
2 = 0. We now verify that v(p;gp) is concave
in p, thus p = 1=2 is a maximum. By b > 1=2, we have h(x) =
@u2(x;p)
@p = 2(x+b) 1 > 0.







is nondecreasing in p. Furthermore, since b p
 u2(x
p
2;p) = 1, the above expression is non-
negative for all x  x
p
2. Thus, the right-hand side term in (11) is nonincreasing in p. A
similar argument shows that the term in (12) is nonincreasing in p as well. It follows that
v(p;gp) is concave in p.
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